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COMMENTS
PoLITICAL COMMITTEE EXPENDITURES AND THE HATCH AcT-Democratic governments are rightly concerned about how money is
used to influence elections. The oft-quoted proverb, "He who pays
the piper calls the tune," contains a large grain of truth. In many
countries comprehensive statutory regulation of campaign expenditures
may be found; but it is unlikely that any other country can match the
variety of experiments which have been indulged in by-the national
Congress and the forty-eight state legislatures in the United States.
While there are many angles to the problem of regulating the use
of mottey· in elections this discussion is directed to the recent attempt
by the federal government to regulate the size of contributions to and
expenditures by national political committees. American political scientists have commonly asserted that it i~ the sources of political funds
rather than their size which is of chief public concern. American legislators, while not ignoring the sources, have nevertheless chosen to give
their main emphasis to the factor of size. Experience with recent legislation by the federal Congress highlights the difficulties involved in
trying to regulate in this field.
In general there are two possible legislative approaches to the problem of size. One is the approach of publicity, involving enactment of
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statutes providing an elaborate scheme for the reporting of receipts
and expenditures and for subsequent publication of these details in
such a prominent way as to illuminate the whole field of political finance. The underlying assumption of the publicity approach is that
public opinion will effectively limit political expenditures to a reasonable size, since presumably an informed electorate will frown upon
the "buying" of political support through "excessive" expenditures.
The second approach is that of ceiling limitations, involving a determination by the legislative body of the maximum amount which may
reasonably be spent by a political party or candidate to influence the
electorate. Expenditure of a larger amount is· then prohibited. Of
course the two approaches may be used in combination.
The American Congress has only half-heartedly utilized the publicity approach. As early as r9ro it passed a statute requiring publicity of receipts and expenditures by political committees.1 Although
the publicity provisions were strengthened somewhat in r 9 r 2 2 those
who have studied the matter, including congressional investigating
committees, are unanimous in the opinion that the publicity provisions are so weak as merely to create the illusion of publicity. Specific criticisms have generally emphasized the lack of a single central
office for the filing of reports of receipts and expenditures, the failure
to vest in such an office power to develop uniform accounting forms
and to prepare compilations of data on file so as to render the information filed intelligible to the public, and the utter unconcern of officials
over failure to file at all or in a form in accordance with the legal requirements.
As Professor Overacker has well said, "Publicity of contributions
as of expenditui;es-pitiless, continuous, and intelligent publicity, extending to nonparty as ·well as party organizations-is the least that
a democracy should demand." 8 Yet, according to Dr. James K. Pollock,
a leading student on this subject, "The statements that are filed ...
do not serve the purposes of publicity . . . the statements . . . are
frequently unintelligible. There is little question but that they are
sad commentaries on public accounting." 4 And the special committee
of the United States Senate which thoroughly investigated 1936 election campaign expenditures reported: " . . . there is no accounting
practice in the Un_ited States today which presents so many complexi36 Stat. L. i67 (1910).
37 Stat. L. 360 (1912).
8
Quoted in "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Presidential, Vice
Presidential, and Senatorial Campaign Expenditures in I 944" (hereafter cited as
"Green Committee Report"), S. REP. 101, 79th Cong., Ist sess., at p. 7.
4
PARTY CAMPAIGN FUNDS 188 (1926).
1
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ties arising from lack of uniformity and completeness as that of political organizations." 5
Although the federal Congress had utilized ceiling limitations
for candidates for the Senate and the House of Representatives since
191 l 6 these had been rendered ineffective in part by obvious failure
to cover the large sums spent indirectly on behalf of candidates and
party tickets by political committees. Up to 1940 political committees
had no other obligation than to report their receipts and expenditures
under the inadequate publicity provisions previously described. In that
year Congress embarked upon a program of regulation by direct ceiling
limitation. Section 20 of the Hatch "Clean Politics" Act 7 provided
that no political committee should henceforth receive contributions
or make expenditures aggregating more than $3,000,000 in any
calendar year.
By what process, either of reasoning or of legerdemain, the
$3,000,000 figure was arrived at it has been impossible to ascertain.
A careful examination of the printed debates on the Hatch Act in
Congress and of the reports of the Senate and House committees to the
Congress throws little light on the question. It is significant that the
act as originally introduced by Senator Hatch contained no ceiling
limitation provision. In fact, Senator Hatch at first opposed all amendments designed to put such limitations upon expenditure when presented on the :floor of the Senate. It was in the House of Representatives that the $3,000,000 limitation was slipped into the bill, and the
Senate was later compelled to concur. However the $3,000,000 figure
was arrived at, it seems likely that it was the purpose of its proponents
to reduce to that amount all expenditures on behalf of a particular
national party ticket ( whether these expenditures should be made
through one political committee, or through several committees). 8
The limitation was tested during the presidential elections of 1940
and 1944. It may be observed that the limitation has not reduced
over-all political expenditures; at the same time it has materially
impaired the e:ffectiv~ness of the existing publicity provisions applying
to political committees. A special Senate committee which studied
the 1940 campaign reported: "The committee members are unani-:5 "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures of
Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Senatorial Candidates in 1936," S. REP. 151, 75th
Cong., 1st sess., at p. 136.
6
37 Stat. L. 25 (i911).
7
54 Stat. L. 772 (1940).
8
Senator Hatch testified before a Senate committee that it was the intent of
Congress to limit to $3,000,000 the aggregate collections and expenditures of all
political committees supporting the same presidential candidate. See Louise Overacker,
"Campaign Finance in the Presidential Election of I 940," 3 5 AM. Pou. Sex. REv.
701 at 705 (1941).
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mously of the opinion that the limitations on expenditures for campaign purposes sought to be imposed by the provisions of the Hatch
Act .have been largely ineffective.... " 9 Its r 944 counterpart committee unanimously recommended removal of the $3,000,000 limitation, calling it "utterly unrealistic" and positively harmful.10
As indicated previously, a fundamental assumption of the ceiling
limitation approach is that the legislative body has made a serious
attempt to determine the maximum "reasonable" amount that may be
properly collected or expended during a political !=ampaign. If the
:figure is set too low it is an invitation to evasion. Any ceiling limitation :figure necessarily represents a moral judgment. Its enforcement
will depend in large measure on how it conforms to public opinion
in the body politic. Since the use of money in connection with politicial
campaigns is not an evil per se, the legislative body which chooses to
set a ceiling limitation on its use undertakes a serious responsibility.
While it is difficult to determine precisely what _would be a proper
ceiling limitation there is no such difficulty in showing that the
$3,000,000 :figure was too low. In a country of some one hundred
thirty odd millions of people.living in a territory covering some three
million odd square miles it is impossible to present a presidential candidate and supporting ticket for any such :figure. In the words of the
r944 Senate investigating committee: "The extensive presentation of
issues and candidates in a national campaign is basic to successful operation of the democratic process and necessarily requires expenditures
of a sum greater than $3,000,000." 11
That this is so is-corroborated by comparison with the amounts spent
by private advertisers of commercial products and with the amounts
spent prior to r940 by the national party committees of the two major
parties. Thus, in the calendar year r943, General Foods Sales Corporation spent approximately eleven and one-half million dollars for
radio and press advertising; General Motors Corporation spent over
nine million, and Proctor and Gamble spent over :fifteen million. 12 If ,
single business enterprises spend such amounts, surely expenditures
approaching these are not too unreasonable when they are made for
the legitimate purpose of informing the vast electorate on political
issues and candidates. Indeed, one might question whether the enforcement of the $3,000,000 limitation as an over-all ceiling would not so
0
"Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Presidential, Vice Presidential,
and Senatorial Campaign Expenditures in 1940," S. REP. 47, 77th Cong., 1st sess.,
at p. 80.
10
"Green Committee Report," S. REP. 101, 79th Cong., 1st sess., at p. 82.
11
Id. at p. 79.
12
See STANDARD ADVERTISING REGISTER, Product Edition for April, 1944, for
these and other figures on commercial advertising budgets.
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stifle discussion as to hinder the formation of an intelligent public
opinion on these matters.
Moreover it is of some significance that prior to the adoption of
the Hatch Act the official national party committees of the two major
parties had in recent presidential election years often collected and
spent more than $3,000,000. At the same time these committees had
tended to monopolize the collection and expenditure of funds for support of the national party ticket. The Hatch Act was effective to the
extent that the official national party committees were limited to receipts and expenditures of $3,000,000,13 but avoidance of its spirit was
quickly developed by the mushroom growth of "independent" or non-party committees through which political funds could be channeled,
and by the increased financing of national campaigns by state and local
committees over which Congress has doubtful legal jurisdiction. Thus
Senate investigators found tl}at at least $6,095,357.79 was spent
by political committees supporting the Democratic ticket and
$16,621,435.86 was spent by political committees supporting the Republican ticket in the r 940 election. In the r 944 election the corresponding figures were $7,441,799.56 for the Democratic ticket and
$r3,r95,376.9r for the Republican ticket.
Not only has there been a failure to secure a $3,000,000 over-all
limitation upon expenditures by political committees on behalf of a
particular party's national ticket, but there has been a further weakening of the already weak publicity provisions of previously existing law.
It is obvious, as r 944 Senate investigators pointed out, that the Hatch
Act limitation "has undermined the publicity feature of Federal corrupt-practices legislation by encouraging dispersion of political fund
raising and expending." u The official national party committees cannot
afford to play fast and loose with laws governing election funds; as
responsible party agencies they keep accurate records and comply
reasonably well with federal publicity requirements. But the numerous
"independent" and ot~er committees have no such feeling of respon.sibility, frequently failing to file statements •of receipts and expenditures. Even if filed, their very number and variety makes an intelligent
understanding of their significance impossible without an extensive
comparative analysis of all the statements. In the period of official
national party committee dominance there was no such difficulty. Furthermore, dispersion had led to considerable racketeering through the
preying upon contributors by "phony" political committees which use
13

It 'is an ironic commentary on the limitation that the Republican National Committee officially reported receipts of $2,999,999.48 in 1944, just 52 cents less than
the permitted amount. See "Green Committee Report," S. ~EP., 101, 79th Cong.,
1st sess., at p. 79·
14
Ibid.
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the funds collected for private purposes rather than for the benefit
of the party's national ticket. Thus, while ine:ffective in reducing
materially the aggregate of political expenditures on behalf of a particular national party ticket, the ceiling limitation in the Hatch Act
has proved positively harmful because of its encouragement of dispersion of collection and expenditure channels.
While statutory provisions requiring use of an official national party
committee to serve as sole agent for collecting and expending political
funds might be adopted in the attempt to plug the loophole in the
present law, such provisions attract little legislative support. The
American federal environment does not favor the sole agent device.
State and local committees would protest vehemently and with some
legal basis. BJsides, there would still remain the problem of deciding
on the size of the permissible receipts and expenditures by the soleagent committee.
Since publicity has never really been tried, it would seem better
at this time to get rid of the ceiling limitation approach entirely and
try real publicity. This would avoid the evil of too low a ceiling
limitation. After political expenditures had reached their natural level
under the whip of public opinion guided by publicity it would be time
enough to decide whether a ceiling limitation would be desirable. In
the United States we too often seek'to establish moral standards by
law without first determining whether they ate strongly backed by
the community. Prohibition, though written into our time-honored
Constitution, proved unenforceable for this reason. Experience with
the $3,000,000 limitation in the Hatch Act once again illustrates the
danger involved in adoption of legislation imposing standards of
political morality where there is no apparent agreement on the part
of either the politician or the public. It is well to remember the admonition of the 1944 Senate investigating committee: "Intelligent and
continuous publicity will focus public attention upon the size of campaign funds and thus public opinion itself may regulate where prohibi- ·
tion without publicity has failed." 15

John W. Lederle*
15

Id. at p. 82.
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